The NPRM says data sent to and collected by a Remote ID USS is not restricted to the basic message elements of operator and craft identification and location. The FAA specifically suggests a Remote ID USS could also collect “a camera feed or telemetry data”. (See Page 97, Section X, A, 2, Paragraph 2).
In effect, the NPRM establishes a baseline for a national, real-time, aerial surveillance network having significant implications for personal privacy and safety and exposes a significant national security risk.
In January 2020, the U.S. Department of the Interior grounded all of its foreign made drones over concerns that such drones could hypothetically conduct surveillance and transmit intelligence data over the Internet. In reality, a drone that is not connected to the Internet or whose SD card is never accessible to the Internet, is incapable of “spying”. The US Army grounded its Chinese-made drones in 2017, over fears of espionage.
Yet simultaneously, the FAA is mandating all drones be connected to the Internet in real time – and most of those drones will be made in China – and the Remote ID USS will be located who-knows-where.
Per the government’s own statements, the FAA is mandating a threat to national security by establishing an Internet connected fleet of aerial drones collecting data across the entire country.